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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
DEE JAY BIGLER and CAROL 
BIGLER, his wife, 
·Plaintiffs-Respondents, 
vs. 
MAPLETON IRRIGATION CANAL 
COMAPNY and JOHN DOES I, 
II and.III, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
DEE JAY BIGLER AND CAROL BIGLER, HIS WIFE 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action based on the negligent flooding of the 
plaintiffs-respondents' _property. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The action was tried on the 20th, 21st and 25th of January, 
1982. The case was then submitted to a jury to answer questions 
on a special verdict form. The jury found the defendant, 
Mapleton Irrigation Canal Company, negligent and awarded 
damages to the plaintiffs-respondents in the amount of $8,361.70. 
It is from that judgment that the defendant appeals. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Plaintiffs~respondents seek to have the judgment of the 
lower court affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The pl_aintiffs-respondents, Dee Jay Bigler and Carol Bigler, 
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are shareholders in the defendant Mapleton Irrigation Canal 
Company, owning one share of Hobblecreek and one share of Straw-
berrv Water (R. 196). The plaintiffs have been residents of 
the city of Mapleton for fourteen years and-ha!f!e occupied the 
home that was flooded for twelve years (R. 191, 384). During 
that entire period of time the plaintiffs have been irrigating 
the .97 acre parcel of land where their home is located with 
water procured through the defendant irrigation company (R. 191, 
384). 
The water that is turned into the lateral .that services 
the plaintiffs' property originates in the Strawberry Canal which 
carries ninety second feet of water and flows year around (R. 
285). The water is diverted from the Strawberry Canal into the 
Fullmer Ditch by lifting a headgate which is locked arid secured 
and can be unlocked only by the defendant's water master (R. 
285). The Fullmer Ditch usually only carries six second feet 
of water, but on the date of the incident, was carrying twelve 
second feet or two streams of water (R. 286~87). From the _ 
Fullmer Ditch, water is diverted at a concrete headgate into a 
lateral that serves the plaintiffs and nine other property owners 
who use the water from one-half hour to two hours each (R. 287-90, 
Ex. 19, 20). 
The ditch that runs by the plaintiffs' property and the other 
nine property owners dead-ends at the property of the tenth land-
mmer (Julander and Mayberry) and is not used to transport water to 
any other area, to irrigate other land or to transport waste water 
(R. 203). Accordingly, unless the ten property owners are scheduled 
-2-
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for i.rrigati.on, there is no water in r-he ditch rhat r.uns by 
the plaintiffs' property (R. 203, 232, 128-30). 
Lewis Snow, the seventy year old 1,1ater master for the defen-
dant company, testified he had been the water waster for fourteen 
years and was paid a salary of Eight Thousand Dollars a year 
(R. 269). Mr. Snow established that it was his responsibility 
to check the headgates and insure they were in good repair (R. 
271). Snow, recognizing the potential danger of flooding and 
the dangers created by the water, testified that it was the 
company's responsibility to make sure that its employees knew 
where the irrigation water was at any given time (R. 272, 275) 
and to keep an accurate written record of the location and use 
of the water (R.272, Ex. 18)~ Snow testified that during the 
fourteen years of his service, he had ahmys known where the 
water was (R. 290). Snow further testified that he had pur-
chased locks f~r the headgates on the main canal and it was 
the policy of the defendant to keep them locked (R. 280). 
With regard to how the shareholders are informed as to an 
upcoming water turn, the defendant, through answers to interro-
gatories and live testimony,· established· that the watermaster 
informed the stockholders of the upcoming water turns by making 
a personal call or by having a person up the ditch notify them 
(R. 281, 282, 20). The defendant's policy was that if the share-
holder was not notified, water would not be turned to the 
shareholder (R. 281, 282, 20). Several shareholders testified 
that they had never or seldom been contacted by the watermaster 
about an upcoming turn (R. 263, 196, 197, 385-86). 
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The plaintiffs and the waterrnaster, Lewis Snow, all testi-
fied that in fourteen years, the water had never been in the 
ditch that services the plaintiffs' property unless prior 
notice had been given (R. 282, 288, 204, 387)~ Snow testified 
that shareholders had a right to believe they did not have to 
worry about water coming down the ditch unexpectedly (R. 281, 
282, 288, 289, 314), and the plaintiffs testified that.they 
did not think there was any risk that the· water would be.in the 
ditch unexpectedly (R. 204, 205, 257, 387). 
The landowners along the ditch in question would have a 
water turn, depending on the time of year, every ten days to 
three weeks, but never more often _than every ten days (R. 204, 
391-2, 287). Needless to s.ay, the water had never been back in 
=. the ditch the day after ·the irrigation turns had been completed 
by the ten property owners (R. 203-4 387-88, 391). 
The plaintiffs are usually the next-to-last property owners 
to irrigate on the ditch in question, Julander and Mayberry being 
the last users (R. 135, 211). Only on four occasions, in the 
plaintiffs' experience, had they been the last to irrigate (R. 
49, 386). 
At nine-thirty, a.m., on August 24,. 1979, 11r·s. Bigler re-
ceived a call from an up-ditch user that the water would arrive 
at the plaintiffs' property at appro~imately two o'clock, p.m., 
(R. 388). The plaintiff, Carol Bigler, had planned to leave 
and do some school shopping for her four children that morning, 
but before leaving, was informed by Melvina Johnson that the 
water would not arrive at the.plaintiffs' property until three-
~4-
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thirty in the afternoon (R. 388). The plaintiff, Car.al 
Bigler, went shopping and returned a~ two o'clock in the after-
noon to find that the watermaster had turned the water earlier 
than expected and that Julanders (normally the--last person to use 
the water) had commenced irrigating (R. 388-89). 
Julanders informed the plaintiff, Carol Bigler, that he had 
told the watermaster to turn the water out of the ditch at 
three-thirty, the time Julander would be through irrigating, and 
if Biglers wanted to water they would have to contact the water-
master (R. 328, 389). 
The plaintiff, Carol Bigler, contacted the watermaster, Lewis 
Snow, and he agreed not to turn the water out of the ditch until 
four-thirty, p.m., (R. 328, 389-90). 
Devan Bigler, :the fourteen year old son of the plaintiffs, 
who had irrigated by himself for four years (R~ 327, 391, 206), 
·was informed by Julander at three-thirty that Biglers could put 
in their headgate to divert the water onto the Bigler. property (R. 
328-29). Devan put in the headgates so that all the water. from 
the ditch would go on the Bigler property and no additional 
water would go down the ditch to Julander and :Mayberry (R. 329). 
The plaintiff, D. J. Bigler, came home from work during the turn 
and checked with his son (R. 212). At four-thirty, the water 
was shut off by the watermaster and accordingly the water quit 
flowing in the ditch (R. 329-30, 293). 
Devan left the headgate in so that the small amount of 
water remaining in the ditch would not flow down to Julanders, 
who was apprehensive about additional water after his turn was 
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completed (R. 201, 202, 407). The last person to use the 
i;,.mter on the ditch routinely left the headgate in for the 
next turn because there was no chance of flooding or water 
coming down unexpectedly (R. 204, 205, 206 ;:· 2T'7, 332, 387). 
The plaintiff, Mr. Bigler, was working graveyards and went 
to bed on the evening of August 24th at about four-thirty in 
the afternoon (R. 213). Mrs. Bigler and three of the children 
went to a church gathering and arrived home at ten-thirty, 
p.m., at which time she awoke Hr. Bigler to go to work (R. 
390-91). The family was awakened at six-thirty the next morn-
ing by the screams of the boys in the bedroom who discovered 
twelve to fourteen inches of water and sewage (caused by the 
---· 
flooding of ·the se·p.tic tank) in their. basement (R. 333-34, 
212-216). 
Devan went immediately to the back of the property to see 
a full stream of water in the ditch (R. 334-35). 
The defendant's own expert testified that the water in the 
ditch -o had to have been running from four to five and a 
half hours after the end of the turn to cause the damage done 
to the plaintiffs' residence (R. 476-87). 
The defendant maintained at trial that it had no knowledge 
of how the water, during the night, got into the plaintiffs' 
ditch (Interrogatory No,. 11, R. 518, 21). The defendant never 
conducted an investigation to determine the cause of the flood-. 
ing (R. 515-513), though requested to do so on numerous occasions 
by the plaintiffs (R. ·229, 230, 231). 
Mysteriously, all of the records of the irrigation company 
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whi.ch would show wher.e the water was when the Biglers wcrL' 
flooded were missing. The waterrnaster initiallv testified that 
the records for fourteen years were gone (R. 273). The water-
master then testified that someone had entered-his truck 
(between July 18th and 20th, 1979) and stolen half of his 
rec~rds (R. 514, 276-78). In spite of the fact that some 
records were purportedly stolen on July 18, 1979, three weeks 
before the flooding, no explanation was made throughout the 
trial for the absence of the records of the water on August 24, 
1979, one month after the alleged theft (R. 278-79, 298-99, 
514-517). In· fact, the records were available for all the 
shareholders involved up to approximately August 20, 1979, 
four days prior to the flooding (R. 274-80). 
The defendant's agents and employees testified that the 
company should have had locks and chains on the headgates 
involved in causing the flooding of the plaintiffs' property 
(R. 75-76, 264-65). 
The watermaster testified that contrary to his admitted 
duties and responsibilities he did not check the ditches on the 
night of August 24, 1979 (R. 296, 297) and in fact, checked 
them for the last time at four o'clock on the afternoon of 
August 24, 1979 (R. 296-97). The watermaster did not check the 
ditches involved in this action again until twelve o'clock noon 
on August 25, 1979 (R. 297-98). A period of twenty hours 
went by without any inspection or checking on twelve second feet 
of water (R. 296-97). In addition to the total derogation of 
his responsbilities, in failing to monitor the water, no records 
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of where the water had gone or where it was scheduled were ever 
written (R. 298-99). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE JURY 
AS TO THE STANDARD OF CARE APPLICABLE TO THE 
CASE. 
The trial court gave twenty-five instructions to the jury, 
three of which dealt with the specific duties. of both the plain-
tiffs and the defendant (Instructions 7, 8 and 9; R. 103-5). 
Instruction No. 7 informed the jury that the degree of 
care which a person is required to.exercise increases in pro-
portion to the hazards to be anticipated. That instruction is 
not excepted to by the appellant and accordingly, no further 
comment will be made regarding it. 
Instruction No. 8 dealt specifically with the duty of the 
irrigation company and provided as follows: 
It was the duty of the defendant irrigation 
company, its agents and employees, in deliver-
ing water to its users, to observe and be 
aware of the conditions of their ditches, 
the amount of water therein and other exi.st-
ting conditions; in that regard, the defen-
dant was obliged to observe due care with 
respect to: 
1. To cause notice to be given to 
its users of their watering turn 
when water is turned into defen-
dant's laterals from which the 
user takes its turn. 
2. To use reasonable care to turn 
the water out of its lateral ditches 
when the watering turns are over. 
3. To use reasonable care in knowing 
w~ere the water is in its irriga-
tion system to prevent the same 
-8-
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fron flowing into ditches where 
users are not on notice of its pre-
sence, or expectation in such ditch . 
. The failure of defendant to exercise ordinary 
care in discharging the aforesaid dutv shall 
be considered negligence depending o~ the par-
ticular surrounding facts and circumstances. 
(R. 104). The appellant's only take exception to the third 
subpart of that instruction. To properly analyze Instruction 
No. 8, it is necessary to set out the instruction the court gave 
with regard to the responsibility of the plaintiffs. Instruction 
No. 9 provided as follows: 
(R. 105). 
The plaintiffs using the irrigation waters 
delivered through defendant's ditches were 
required to use reasonable care in taking the 
water onto their property, and turning it back 
into the defendant's ditches thereafter, to 
avoid such waters causing damage to their own 
and other persons property along the irrigation 
.ditch. In that regard, the standard of care 
required of plai.ntiff s would be in accordance 
with the customary practice of the users of 
water on defendant's ditch; ordinary care in 
diverting the stream to their lands and in 
turning the water back to the defendant's ditch 
after their turn. The failure of plaintiffs 
to conform to said standard of care could be 
considered negligence, depending on the surround-
ing facts and circumstances of this case. 
It is the contention of the respondents that the trial 
court properly instructed as to the responsibilities of both 
parties in this action and that the conduct of the trial court 
should not be reversed on appeal for six reasons. 
A. The defendant failed to properly object to the giving 
of Instruction No. 8. 
The responsibility of trial counsel in objecting to jury 
instructions was set out by this Court in Snyderville Transpor-
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tation Co., Inc. v. Christiansen, 609 P.2d 939 (Utah 1980). 
Chief Justice Hall speaking for the Court stated as follow~: 
Under Utah law, a party on appeal may not 
assign as error either the giving or failure 
to give an instruction unless he ,fj.r~t pro-
proposes correct instructions, and should the 
court fail to give them, to then except 
thereto. The exception should be specific 
enough to give the trial court notice of 
everv error in the instruction which is 
complained of on appeal. 
Id. at 942. See also Employer's Mutual Liability Insurance Co. 
v. Allen Oil Compa.nv, 123 Utah 253, 258 P.2d 455 (1953); 
Redevelopment Agency.of Salt Lake City v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47 
(Utah 1974). 
The facts of this case indicate that the defendant-appellants 
proposed seven jury instructions for cori'.sideration-rby· the court 
=·. (R. 87-93, 96). Not one of the instructions describes the duties 
and responsibilities of defendant-appellant as set out in Instruc-
tion No. 8. Defendant's proposed Instruction No.· 1 simply states 
that the irrigation company is not an insurer against damages 
and proposed Instruction No. 2 simply states that the parties in 
this action are held to act in accordance with ordinary intelli-
gence and prudence (R. 88, 89). All of the other instructions 
proposed by defendant deals specifically with the responsibilities 
of the plaintiffs. 
In specifically dealing with Instruction No. 8, counsel 
for the defendant at trial simply objected to the giving of the 
instruction on the basis that it went beyond any established law 
in the state of Utah but failed to propose _any alternative in-
struction which detailed the responsibility of the irrigation 
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company as perceived by counsel for the defendant (R. 571). 
In fact, the only comment of defendant's counsel relative to 
Instruction No. 8. was as follows: 
(R. 571). 
As to the instructions to be given, ~efen­
dant takes exception to Instruction No. 8 
on the ground that it goes way beyond any 
established law in the state of Utah and is 
prejudicial to the defendant. It also makes 
the company responsible for acts wav bevond 
their control and it basicallv smacks that 
absolute liability of the defendant water 
company, regardless of other persons. 
It is respectfully submitted that the one paragraph comment 
-
by counsel for the defendant was certainly not sufficient to 
alert the trial court to the fact that the defendant was only 
objecting to subpart 3 of Instruction No. 8 nor was it suffi-
cient to detail for the court what the defendant's specific 
objection was. As noted by the Court in Snyderville, supra, 
a party, before raising an in~truction as error on appeai must 
first propose a correct instruction and then take a specific 
exception to the instruction given that is sufficient to give 
the trial court notice of every error in the instruction which 
is complained of on appeal. It is respectfully submitted that 
the instructions submitted by defendant-appellant were totally 
inadequate to describe the defendant's contention as to the duty 
of care that was applicable and further, that the exception 
taken by counsel to the giving of Instruction No. 8 was inade-
quate. 
B. Instruction No. 8 correctly states the irrigation com-
pany's standard of care. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has analyzed the responsibility of 
an irrigation company on a number of occasions. In interpreting 
Utah Code Annotated §73-1-8 (1~53 as amended),. the early Utah 
Supreme Court cases clearly stated that the,.,.oWIJ.,.ers of canals or 
ditches used for irrigation had the duty of exercising ordinary· 
care so as to prevent injury and damage to others and that the 
failure to exercise ordinary care and prudence constituted negli-
gence for which the injured party may recover. Jensen v. Davis 
and Ueber Counties Canal C~mpany, 44 Utah 10, 137 P. 635 (1913); 
Chipman.v. American Fork City, 46 Utah 134, 148 P. 1103 (1915); 
Mackav v. Breeze, 72 Utah 305, 269 P. 1026 (1928). 
The Court dealt with the same question in detail in the 
case of West-Union.Canal Company v. Provo Bench Canal and Irri-
gati9n, 208 P.2d 1119 (Utah 1949). In that case, the plaintiff 
claimed that the defendant negligently allowed the water from 
the South East ditch to run into Main Street and to wash sand, 
gravel, rubb.ish and debris into its canal and to greatly increase 
·the quantity of water flowing therein, thereby causing the canal 
to fill up at the bridge and to break at the pipe intake at Skinner 
Hollow. The court found in favor of the plaintiff and awarded 
damages and the· defendant appealed. The Utah Supreme Court 
affirmed and in that decision·cited the long list of early Utah 
cases standing for the proposition that an irrigation company is 
liable for its negligence. The Court found that the defendant's 
failure to use reasonable care in properly regulating the flow 
water into the South East ditch was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's damages. Id., at 1123. 
-12-
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In Nestman v. South David County Water Improvement Disrrict, 
16 Utah 2d 198, 398 P. 2d 203 (1965), the plai.ntj_f f, a horileowner, 
sued the defendant irrigation district for damages caused to 
their home and its contents by flooding when tlle defendant's 
resevoir gave way. The Court spent the majority of the opinion 
analyzing whether or not the Doctrine of Soverign Immunity applied 
but again relied upon and cited to the previous cases for the 
proposition that a water supplier is responsible for its negli-
gence. Id., at 205. 
In Anderson v. Pleasant Grove Irrigation Company, 26 Utah 2d 
420, 490-P.2d 897 (1971), this Court was faced with an action 
which is similar to the case at bar. In that case, the defen-
dant company delivered water to its stockholders under the 
direction of a twenty-four hour a day watermaster who notified 
the shareholders of the time for their "turns" at using the 
water. Evidence was admitted in that case to the effect that 
a heavy volume of water caused an overflowing of the headgates 
and culverts. Other evidence reflected an overcapacity flow con~ 
siderably in excess of that w~ich the company and the watermaster 
knew would likely damage the property of landowners below. In 
that case, the defendants asserted on appeal that neither the 
irrigation company nor its watermaster had any duty to see where 
the water went, since that was the duty of the stockholders, 
after notice of their "turns". The same contention is made by 
the appellant in this case to the effect that there is no 
responsibility on the part of the irrigation company to use 
reasonable care to know where the water is in its irrigation 
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system or to prevent the water from flowing into ditches 
where users are not on notice of its presence. 
This Court in Anderson, supra., in reply to the defendants' 
contention stated as follows: 
We cannot subscribe to such contention, 
since it connotes some kind of concept that 
an irrigation company and its watermaster 
may indulge the luxury of inoculation 
against liability by the simple device of 
sending a registered or unregistered letter 
or.by making a telephone call, if you please, 
to its stockholders. Also, it seems to say 
that a primary duty not to injure others 
can be dissipated by an unwarranted and 
unlegal delegation of that obligation in 
order to immerse one with holy water 
rather than that which may drown oneself. 
Id., at 198 !" 
There;;·can be no seriou~<· q~estion that the And_erson, supra., 
decision stands for the proposition that an irrigation ·company 
must use reasonable care to monitor the location of the water 
in its irrigation system and to use reasonable care to prevent it 
from flowing into ditches where users are not on notice of its 
presence. Contrary to the argument of appellant in its brief, 
the jury instruction given by the court does not impose strict 
liability. The instruction simply requires that the defendant 
u_se reasonable care under the circumstances in knowing where 
the water is as specified in Anderson, supra. 
The Court dealt with this subject again in Erickson v. 
Bennion, 28 Utah 2d 371, 503 P.2d 139 (1972). In that case, 
plaintiff sought to recover damages caused to their home and pro-
perty by irrigation water which flowed there after use by the 
defendant. After the presentation of the plaintiffs' evidence, 
the defendant made a motion to dismiss which was granted by the 
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court. The facts in the case indicated that the defendant was 
an irrigation water user and that his waste water had flowed 
on the plaintiffs' property because of a widening of the 
Delta-Fillmore highway and because the plaintiffs had con-
structed a driveway by filling in the borrow pit which also 
had affected the drainage. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the 
decision of the trial court on the basis that the plaintiffs had 
failed to prove that the defendant was in any way negligent and 
on the basis that the plaintiffs' contributory negligence in 
maintaining the driveway caused their own damages. In affirm-
ing the trial court, the Supreme·Court made several comments 
relative to the responsibility of the irrigation water user. 
It is to be~ :..conceded ·to £the plaintiff that 
the degree of care increases in proportion 
to the hazards to be anticipated; and 
that because of the dangers inherent in 
the management of flowing waters, the con-
cept of ordinary care and prudence under 
the particular circumstances requires that 
its management not be left to novices, but 
should only be entrusted to persons of some 
experience- and skill in the management of 
such waters, who would have an awareness of 
the various hazards in the failure to 
properly control them and would therefore 
exercise the degree of foresight and pre-
cautj_on which people of such experience 
and skill would observe to avoid injury 
or damage to others and their property. 
Id., at 141. 
It is respectfully submitted that the Erickson, supra, 
case·stands firmly for the proposition stated in Instruction Ho. 
8 that the management of irrigation waters is not to be left to 
novices and that the ·degree of care increases. in proportion .to 
the hazards to be anticipated and requires the persons who con-
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trol the water to exercise that degree of foresight and pre-
caution which people of such experience and skill would 
observe to avoid injury and damage to a·thers. 
The Court dealt once again with the su]:>jest in Dougherty v. 
California-Pacific Utilities Company, 546 P.2d 880 (Utah 1976). 
In that case, the plaintiff sued the utility company to recover 
for damages resulting from·the flooding of their home by the 
overflow of the defendant's canal. The trial court found in 
favor of the plaintiff. In that case, the flooding was caused 
by an usually severe rain and hailstorm which caused the canal 
to rise and overflow its bank and flood the plaintiff's property. 
The defendant contended on appeal ·that the unusually severe 
storm was ari.. Act of God. ·In retort', ~the. ~6urt stat;ed: _ 
Whether the occurrence should be so classi-· 
fied as "an Act of God'' depends upon whether 
the storm was of such magnitude and severity 
that it was not reasonably to be foreseen 
and guarded against by the traditional, 
reasonable and prudent man under the cir-
cumstances. 
Id., at 882.· 
The Court then stated that since there was evidence that 
cloudbursts of considerable magnitude are.noted in the area, 
that the trial court had the right to adopt the plaintiff's view 
of the evidence. Again, the Court cited to Utah Code Annotated 
§73-1-8 and cited it for the proposition that persons who handle 
irrigation water must be held to the standard of due care under 
the circumstances and that includes taking cognizance of the 
fact that the degree of care increases in proportion to the 
hazards anticipated. Id., at 882. The standard set out in the 
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Utah cases is entirely consistent with the weight of authoriry. 
See cases cited in Brizendine v. NamQa Meridian Irrigation 
District, 97 Idaho 580, 548 P.2d 80 (1976); Pince v. Phelen, 
496 P.2d 905 (Wyo. 1972). .... 
The case law in Utah supports the court's instruction that 
the defendant has a duty to use reasonable care in knowing where 
the water was in its irrigation system and to prevent the same 
from flowing into ditches where users are not on notice of its 
presence. Even aside from the rulings of the Supreme Court, 
the defendant's waterrnaster testified that it was his responsi-
bility, recognizing the potential danger of flooding to make sure 
that he and the other employees of the company knew where the 
irrigation ·water -was at any given-~' time. (R. 272, 275). Further, 
Lewis Snow, the watermaster, testified that it was his responsi-
bility to keep an accurate written record of the location and 
use of the water throughout each day (R. 272, Ex. 18, 275). 
Snow testified that during the fourteen years of his· service, 
he had always known.where the water was and that the water, 
during that time, had never gone down the ditch by the plain-
tiffs'. property unannounced (R. 282, 288, 204, 387). Finally, 
the watermaster testified that shareholders had a right to 
believe that they did not have to worry about water coming 
down the ditch unexpectedly (R. 281, 282, 288, 289, 314), and 
the piaintif.fs testified that they did not ever think that there 
was any risk that the water would be in the ditch unexpectedly 
(R. 204, 205, 257, 387). In total derrogation of the defendant's 
responsibility, defendant company never conducted an investiga-
-17-
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ti.on to determine the cause of ·the flooding (R. 515-518) · 
Further, the records of the defendant company were never pro-
vided. The failure of the defendant company to justify or ex-
plain the absence of the records became almost~ a laughing matter 
at trial. It is respectfully submitted that the irrigation 
company either purposefully destroyed the records or_ simply did 
not furnish them despite demand by plaintiffs' counsel on the 
basis that they were incriminating. The defendant's own agents 
and employees testified that there should have been locks and 
chains on the headgates involved in causing the plaintiffs' 
damage which was the responsibility of the defendant company. 
Most importantly the vlatermaster testified that he. left the 
water constituting twelve second fee~ at the· Fullmer_ 
ditch and ninety second feet of the Strawberry Canal unattended 
for a period of twenty hours. It is respectfully submitted that 
the instruction given by the court correctly states the law as 
established by this court and also correlates with the responsi-
bilities admitted to and undertaken by the defendant irrigation 
company. 
C. The defendant irrig8:tion company does not have the 
right to abandon the course of conduct undertaken by it. 
It is the respondents' position that Jury Instruction No. 
8 correctly states the law and that, in addition to the fact 
that it is a matter required by the applicable case law, the 
defendant's undertaking of the responsibility of monitoring the 
water at a given time and its representations to its shareholders 
that it monitored the water and that: they had no reason to fear 
..:is-
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that the water would be in the canal unexpectedly imposes an 
additional duty upon them. 
The duty of a volunteer who undertakes to act was expressed 
by Justice Cardozo in Glanzer v. Shepard, 223 N._.Y. 226, 135 N.E. 
275 (1922.): 
• . • It is ancient learning that one who 
assumes to act, even though gratuitously, 
must thereby become subject to the duty of 
acting carefully, if he acts at all • · •• 
135 N.E. 275, 276. 
The modern counterpart of the rule set forth by Justice 
Cardozo is contained in Restatement 2d of Torts, §323: 
One who undertakes gratuitously or for a 
consideration, to render services to 
another which he should recognize as nece-
ssary for the protection of the others 
person or things, is subject to liability 
for physical harm resulting from his 
failure to exercise reasonable care to 
perfonn his undertaking, if (a) his failure 
to exercise such care increases the risk 
of such harm, or (b) the harm is suffered 
because of the other's reliahce upon the 
undertaking. 
It is respectfully submitted that all of the evidence in 
the case established that the defendant took upon itself the 
responsibility of monitoring the ·water and knowing its where-
abouts at any given time. In addition, the defendant took upon. 
itself the responsibility of keeping accurate records to deter-
mine where the water was at any given ti.me. Based upon those 
undertakings, the company represented to its shareholders that 
it had no reason to worry_ or ouard aoainst the harm of water 0 0 -
coming unexpectedly in their ditch. 
All of the evidence supports the application of the Restatement 
_,q_ 
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2d of Torts. The defendant failed to properly perform the 
duty it undertook in that the company failed to monitor the 
water and to keep accurate records. Those failures certainly 
increased the risk of flooding and as the plaintiffs testi-
fied throughout the proceedings, they left the headgate in 
on the basis that it was their understanding that water would 
not be in that ditch unexpectedly. 
D. The appellant cannot claim for the first time .on_·· 
appeal that. there were other causes of floo.ding to the plaintiffs' 
property. 
In contending that Instruction No. 8 improperly character-
ized the law, appellant's argue on pages 6. and 7 of their brief 
that no evidence was present·ed at the trial ·court. ·as ·to the source 
of the water that came down the ditch ·in the mj_ddle of the 
night. Contrary to the appellant's assertion of the fact, the 
plaintiffs' son, Devan, testified that when he was awakened in 
the morning by the la~ge amount of water and sewage in the 
basement, he went to the back of his property where the irriga-
tion ditch was situated and observed a full stream of water at 
that time (R •. 334-35). In addition, the defendant's own exoert 
. ~ 
testified that the water would have to be running from four to 
five and a half hours to cause the damage that it did to the 
plaintiffs' property (R. 476-87). To suggest at this juncture 
in the proceeding that the plaintiffs did not me.et their burden 
of proof in showing the source of the water is simply rebutted 
by the evidence. 
E. Subpart 3 of Instruction No. 8 does not impose strict 
-20-
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liability. 
The appellant argues at great length that-: subpart- 3 of 
Instruction No. 8 given to the jury imposes strict liability 
upon the defendant irrigation company. The instruction expli.citly 
states that the defendant has a duty to use reasonable care in 
knowing where the water is in its irrigation system to prevent 
the same from causing damage. The instruction does not state 
that if the defendant did not know where its water was that it 
was negligence. In fact, the jury well may have concluded that 
the defendant had used reasonable care in knowing where the 
water was in the irrigation system and that reasonable care 
does not require that the defendant know where the water is at 
each ·and-every point in time. 
The problem that the appellant has on appeal is that the 
argument contravenes· the representation of the defendant com-
·pany made at trial that it did know where the water was at 
each and every point in time and that it considered it a re-
sponsibility to both know ·and to document ~lhere the water was. 
Likewise, the instruction requires only that the defendant 
irrigation company us~ reasonable care in preventing the water 
from flowing into ditches where users are not· on notice of its 
presence. The instructio"n does not indicate that if the jury 
finds that water is in a ditch or notice has not been given, 
that it is strictly liable or that it is even negligent. Again, 
the jury could have well determined· that the facts and circum-
stances as presented by the testimony did not warrant an imposi-
tion of liability on the part of the defendant simply because 
-21-
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the water was in the ditch. The jury was given the prerogative 
to wetgh all of the facts and circumstances in the case .. 
Finally, it was again the testimony of the· defendant's 
agents and employees at trial that imputed lJaQ.ility to them. 
It was the defendant's agents and employees that testified that 
the policy of the irrigation company was that no :water would be 
turned to a water user unless notice had been given to them. 
It was the defendant's agents and employees who testl.fied.that 
in fourteen years no water had ever been in that ditch un-
announced and that the persons operating in the Mapleton Irri-
gation Canal Company had. a right to assume that water would not 
be in the ditch unless they were put on notice. In fourteen 
years, the ditch had never.been used for run-off wat~r or waste_ 
.. water from any other distribution system aside from the routine 
regular irrigation turns. The r~presentation to the Court that 
Instruction No. 8 is tantamount to imposing a strtct liability 
test upon the defendant-appellant, is simply without merit. 
F. Subpart 3 of Instruction No. 8 does not require the 
irrigation company to give notice every time the ditch is used 
to transport water. 
On page 10 of the appellant's brief, the point is made that 
subpart 3 of Instruction No. 8 requires the irrigation company 
to notify all property owners when water is passing through 
·the sublateral ditch to another location. Again, appellant's 
argument totally misconstrues the instruction. 
There is nothing in subpart 3 of Instruction No. 8 that 
requires the irrigation company to notify users every time water 
-22-
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is in a ditch. The instruction· simply requires the irrigation 
company to use reasonable care to keep water fr.om flowing into 
ditches where users are not on notice of its presence or expec-
tation in such ditch. It is impossible to analogize the facts 
of the present case to the broad principles announced in the 
appellant's brief. 
This is not a case where the ditch in question is somet:imes 
used to provide irrigation water to property owners and at 
other times is used to transoort water downstream for another 
. ~ 
series of property owners or to conduct waste water. The testi-
mony at trial was that the ditch in question was never used to 
transport water to any other group of landovmers than the ten 
property owners set out in thecc statement of facts. It was 
further the testimony that the ditch in question was never used 
to transport waste water or used for any other purpose. · Again, 
the testimony by Doc Snow, the watermaster; the plaintiffs and 
other persons testifying was that for fourteen years water had 
never been down that ditch except to irrigate the land 
belonging to the ten property owners. It was based upon the 
peculiar nature of the ditch in question that the court gave 
the instruction that the irrigation company owed its shareholders 
reasonable care to keep water from going down the ditch unless 
water ·users were put on notice of its presence or expectation. 
Again, the fact that the irrigation company did not give notice 
does not mean by itself they were guilty of negligence. The 
instruction says firmly that they are only required-to use 
reasonable care and does not state that the lack of notice 
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equates with negligence. 
POINT II 
THE JURY FINDING OF NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART 
OF APPELLt\NT IS SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
;-· 
The standard that this court uses in reviewing the deter-
mination made by a jury has been stated on a number of occasions. 
In Cinpron v. Milkovich, 611 P.2d 730 (Utah 1980), the Utah 
Supreme Court noted: 
The existence of conflicting testimony _is 
of no warrant. It wa$ the jury's preroga-
tive to determine which evidence was to be 
credited and to draw reasonable inferences 
from that evidence, Marsh v. Irvine, 22 Utah 2d 
154, 449 P.2d 996 (1969); of course we 
view the evidence in the light most 
supportive of the verdict. Johnson v. Corn-
. wall Warehouse Co., 15 Ut.ah .. 2d 172 ,·_ 389 
,. ~>P .Zd 710 (1964)... : . . 
. Id. , at 7 3 2. 
This Court has also stated that in reviewing a jury deter-
mination, the court will assume that the jury belived those 
aspects of the evidence which sustained the findings and judg-
ment and therefore makes it analysis of the case and draws its 
conclusions on the basis of facts so found. Gessner v. Dairyland 
Associates, Inc., 611 P.2d 713 (Utah 1980); Ute-Cal Lan~ Deveiop-
r ~ S t, men~ vorp. v. a ner., 605 P. 2d 1240 (Utah 1980) ;· Lamkin v. Lynch, 
600 P.2d 530 (Utah. 1979). 
It is respectfully submitted that there was ample evidence 
upon which the jury could find the defendant negligent. All 
of the bases are set for.th in the statement of facts and accord-
ingly only a summary of the evidence will be provided. 
Fir.st, Lewis Snow, the watermaster testified that he 
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recognized the potential dangers of flooding and that in 
accordance.with the recognition of that hazard,· it was the 
company's responsibility to make sure that he or other employees 
knew where the irrigation water was at any,gi\b.en time. Despite 
the company's recognition that it was their responsibility to 
make sure that the location of the water was known, the agents 
and employees of the defendant left twelve second feet of water 
essentially unaccounted for and unmonitored for twenty hours. 
Second, the .agents and employees of the defendant testi-
fied that it was the company's responsibility to keep an accurate 
written record of the location and use of the water. In that 
_regard, the watermaster testified that during the fourteen years 
- . 
-- ' - - ' - -~ .~:~.:;·:~ ~ - :~- . . -· ~ -~"-' ; •. ~ l'~· - . ~ 1-.. _-, • -
,. ·of· his ·service, he had always known' where: 'the water was ··and had. 
kept records relating to its use. Despite the fact that the 
company recognized that as a responsibility, the appellant 
simply refused and neglected to fulfill its committment. The 
testimony indicated that some records were taken supposedly 
between July 18th and 20th. The defendants were never able to 
show any water users whose records of use had been lost. Further, 
even though records were taken between July 18th and 20th, no 
explanation-was ever made as to the location of the water records 
after that period of time up and through the date of the flood-
ing. Both the watermaster, the director and president of the 
company were unable to reply or answer the simple queries. 
Third, the watermaster for the defendant testified that it 
was his responsibility to purchase and inspect locks for the 
headgates and to maintain control over those diversionary 
-25-
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structures. The evidence at trial indicated that the agents 
and employees of the defendant, after the flooding, admitted that 
there should have been locks on the headgates that divert the 
water to the plaintiffs' property. Obviously,-the lock on the 
head(;ate would have prohibited the diversion of the water down 
the ditch that led to the plaintiffs-respondents' ·property 
without an overt act by the defendant's agents and employees. 
On page 13 of the appellant's brief, the statement of the 
agents and employees of the defendant to the effect that the 
gates involved should have been chained and locked is referred 
to as a hearsay statement. It should be noted that counsel for 
the defendant did not object to the evidence (R. 230), and the 
statement of the president of the boarc1 and_-one of t_he board of 
directors is clearly within the scope of Utah Rules of Evidence 
63(7) and (8) which relate to statements made by persons in 
their individual or representative capacity. 
Fourth, in answers to interrogatories, in depositions 
and on the witness stand, the agents and employees of the defendant 
testified that it was the policy of the Mapleton Irrigation 
Canal Company to infonn the stockholders individually by making 
a personal call or having a person-up the ditch notify them, 
every time water was to be in their particular ditch. -Explicitly, 
the defendants stated in answer to interrogatories that if the 
shareholder was not notified, water was not to be turned to the 
shareholder. Further, Doc Snow, the watermaster for the 
appellant testified that based upon his representations to them, 
shareholders had a right to believe that they did not have to 
-26-
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worr.v about water corning dmm their ditch unexpectedly. Con-
trarv to the explicit representations and warrantees of the 
agents and employees of the defendant, the defendant's agents 
and employ·ees failed to mon.itor the water and take the other 
necessary steps to comply with their own self-imposed standard. 
The plaintiffs-respondents and the other persons on the ditch 
sjmply had no reason to believe that there was any risk that 
the water could get into the ditch unexpectedly. 
Fifth, the wa termaster .for the appe.llant and the respon-
dents testified that in fourteen years, the water had never been. 
in the ditch unexpectedly and that at no time, was waste water 
or other overflow water ever in the ditch. Further, all of 
the testimony· was· conc.lusive that ,the ditch which serviced the 
respondents had no other purpose and did not serve to convey 
water to landowners at some point distant from the plaintiffs. 
In direct contravention of the experience of the respondents 
and the representations of the appellant, 'the appellant ran 
its system in such a manner wherein water could go unmonitored 
for twenty hours and the defendant would have no record or any 
other. means· available to him to isolate the problem or the 
source. 
Sixth, the respondents were told by the agents and employees 
of the def end.ant that the water turns, depending on the time 
of the year, would be separated from ten days to three weeks. 
Contrary to the representations that water turns would never 
be closer together than ten days, the appellant failed to 
monitor the ditch or take other steps to assure the accuracy of 
') 7 -
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
their representations. 
In short, the jury had ample cause to believe that the 
·appellant had failed to exercise ordinary care in discharging 
the duty set out in Instruction No. 8 and to, therefore, find the 
appellant negligent. 
The last point raised by the appellants under Point II 
that the jury finding of negligence was improper, is the argu-
ment that the court's exclusi.on of testimony relating to how· 
other irrigation canal company's work \·laS error. Counsel for 
the appellant proffered the testimony of the expert as follows: 
He would testifv that inasmuch· as he worked 
with most of th~ irrigation companies in 
the valley, in fact, all of them, I believe, 
and am most familiar with their operation, 
and those irrigation companies that had a . 
t 1..irn system, such as the Springville system, 
and he was familiar with those, the obliga-
tion was upon the water users to open and 
close his headgate, and he was to be responsi-
ble for the headgate at all times. That's 
all. 
(R. 567). It is respectfully submitted that the proffer made 
by counsel was totally inadequate. It is hard for counsel for 
respondents to understand the meaning or intent of the proffer. 
The proffer would seem to indicate that the expert would testify 
that he was familiar with the operation of a number of irriga-
tion companies that had a turn system similar to the Springville 
system and that under those turn systems, the obligation was 
upon the wateruser to open and close his headgate and that the 
waten1ser was responsible for ·that headgate at all times •. The 
proffer does not state that the turn system or Springville 
system is analogous to that used by the Mapleton Irrigation Canal 
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Companv. Further, there is no proffer to the effect that the 
by-laws, polici.es and procedures of the other syste~s in the 
val le·.r are similar. to any degree to that used by the appellant· 
Further, there is no indication in the proffer~- that the expert 
was familiar with the irrigation companies at the time that 
the flooding took place. As stated by the trial court, "the 
only relevant testimony in that regard would be the custom on 
·this particular ditch" (R. 67). 
POINT III 
THE JURY'S FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENTS WERE 
NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLIGENT IS SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The test that this court has used in reviewing the actions 
.. . - . ' 
of a jury'"'were set .. 'out in Point· II. Again, the facts relating 
to the issues of negligence and contributory negligence were 
set out in full in the statement.of facts. Again-, only a 
basic recital of those facts is set forth. The jury had ample 
evidence to support the belief that the respondents were not 
contributorily negligent in leaving the headgate in place on 
August_ 24, 1979. 
First, for fourteen years, water had never been down the 
respondents' ditch unexpect.edly. 
Second, the ditch that serviced the respondents' property 
was not used to transport water to any other locat{on and was 
not used to transport waste water and was, in fact, only used 
on a scheduled water turn. 
Third, the water turns on the ditch had intervals from ten 
days to three weeks. The agents and employees of-the ·appellant 
and the respondents testified that at no time during the four-
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teen vears had water been in the ditch the day after. a '.va ter 
turn. 
Fourth, the agents and employees of the defendant explicitly 
represented that no water would in the ditch unless. the water 
users were informed. 
Fifth, it was the custom and practice·of the last person 
to use the water to leave the headgate in so that whatever water 
remained in the ditch as the water was shut off would not be 
diverted on property which had already watered. 
Sixth and finally, the respondents testified unequivocably 
that they did not even comprehend the risk that their property 
would be flooded by le.aving the headgate in. 
·CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that Instruction No. 8 
correctly states the law of the State of Utah as it has been 
promulgated by the case law and by statute. Further, the in-
struction clearly sets forth the duty as promulgated by the 
appellant itself upon which the respondents had a right to 
rely. Section 3 of Instruction No. 8 together with the 
remainder of Instruction No. 8 are all couched in the duty of 
the defendant to use reasonable care and does not mandate that 
the defendant has specific mandatory duties and actions. The 
instruction explicitly states that the failure of the defen-
dant to exercise ordinary care in discharging any of the re-
. sponsibilities set out in Instruction No. 8 could be considered 
negligence depending upon the.particular surrounding facts and 
circumstances. 
It is the respondents' position that there is ample evi-
_'H1 
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dent in the transcript upon which the jury could supp?rt a find-
ing of negligence on the part of the appellants and the lack of 
any co~tributory negligence on the part of the respondents. 
The jury, in weighing the evidence and tes~·imqp.y, simply found 
that the appellant had failed to observe the duties recognized 
by law and recognized by its mm regulations and procedures· 
It is respectfully submitted that the verdict of the jury 
and the damages assessed only compensate the respondents for 
a clear breach of duty by the agents and employees of the 
appellant. 
DATED this L.9' day of August, 1982. 
MAILED a copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS to 
Mr. Michael L. Deamer, UNGRICHT, RANDLE & DEAMER, Attorneys for 
Appellants, Suite 514 Boxton Building, 9 Exchange Place, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111; dated this /Ci day of August, 1982. 
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